Vietnam, 1967: Military intelligence has collapsed, Viet Cong have infiltrated the clandestine American spy network, and the U.S. can't rely on the South Vietnamese. John Murphy, then an elite adviser, analyst, and operative for the Army, CIA, and South Vietnamese intelligence services, reveals the gray areas of critical on-the-ground intelligence work, where trust is hard-won and easily lost. His challenges included: working with the local population to gather information, evaluating material and unreliable agents, dealing with the equally unreliable South Vietnamese Army, administering the controversial Phoenix Program, and confronting the 'body count' expectations of the Johnson administration's military bureaucracy. John's role was equal parts analyst, operative, and diplomat; it was confusion and misinformation from the ground level up. Using never-before-seen archival footage, documents, graphics, and photos, John analyzes why bad intelligence goes up the chain of command to become war policy - a concern as relevant today as it ever was.